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When a child’s piggy bank is full, she can go to a grocery store
and pour it into a change-sorting machine. Such a machine will
sort all the quarters into one slot, all the dimes into another,
and so on, until all the change is sorted and the machine can
add up the sums of each slot. Now imagine a similar machine,
but this time it sorts insects instead of change. A child who
has been collecting bugs has brought them in a jar and pours
them into an insect-sorting machine. The machine takes a
blood sample of each bug and sorts the samples according to
the species to which they belong—identified via a sequence
of their DNA. The child is then given a printout of all the
information regarding each species whose member she has
captured.
Although insect-sorting machines are fictitious, a diag-
nostic technique that makes the use of short DNA sequences
to identify species is real—the technique is known as DNA bar-
coding. Its advocates claim that DNA barcodes can be used
to sort specimens into species at a rate quicker than that of
practicing taxonomists and the resulting groupings are usually
the same. A number of studies purport to have confirmed this;
they are used to justify the (sole) use of barcodes for species
delimitation, as they demonstrate that groupings based on bar-
codes match those of an existing taxonomy. My aim in this
article is to call into question just what these studies license
and whether the sole use of DNA barcodes to delimit species
is indeed justified.
Since the debate over DNA barcoding has been a heated
one (e.g., Hebert and Gregory 2005; Kipling et al. 2005; De-
Salle 2006; Rubinoff 2006), I begin by describing the benefits
and limits of DNA barcoding as presented by its advocates not
its critics. Next, I argue that due to the mutually dependent re-
lationship between defining and delimiting species, all systems
of classification are grounded in theory, even if only implicitly.
I then proceed to evaluate DNA barcoding in that context. In
particular, I focus on the barcoders’ use of a sharp boundary
by which to delimit species, arguing that this boundary brings
along additional theoretical commitments inconsistent with
the way taxonomists conceive of species, viz., as entities that
have vague boundaries and that cannot be defined by any sin-
gle attribute other than ancestry. Given these inconsistencies, I
conclude that even if groupings based on DNA barcodes match
those of an existing taxonomy, the two systems of classification
are not necessarily tracking the same entities, i.e., species.
What Is DNA Barcoding?
DNA barcoding uses a 648-bp region of the mitochondrial
genome—sytochrome c oxidase 1 (CO1)—to identify organ-
isms as belonging to a particular species (Hebert et al. 2003).
In 2003, the founder of DNA barcoding, Paul Hebert, proposed
the compilation of a public library of DNA barcodes that would
be linked to species already defined by taxonomists. Currently,
the database contains 37,639 unique barcodes that match pre-
viously described species (Ratnasingham and Hebert 2007).
The point of the barcode library is to provide a new master key
for identifying species, and hence to make it possible for an
unknown specimen to be identified as a member of a known
species if its sequence closely matches one in the database.
Thus, for instance, the diversity of ant species in Madagas-
car was assessed rapidly by running the collected barcodes
against the library reference code (Smith et al. 2005). Con-
versely, if the CO1 sequence of an unknown specimen does
not match any of the barcodes in the database, it can suggest
the existence of a new species: “Newly encountered species
will ordinarily signal their presence by their genetic divergence
from known members of the assemblage” (Hebert et al. 2003:
318). Hence, when the DNA barcodes of 260 North American
bird species were examined, four of the varieties of known
bird species came out as potential new species because their
sequences diverged past the established sequence similarity
threshold (Hebert et al. 2004).
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Initially, the idea of using DNA barcodes to discover new
species was heavily criticized by taxonomists (e.g., Lipscomb
et al. 2003; Mallet and Willmott 2003; Seberg et al. 2003).
However, DNA barcoding advocates have since restated their
position clarifying that barcodes, by themselves, are never
sufficient to describe new species—only to identify members
of known species:
There is an important distinction between “describing” and “delimit-
ing” species, but a conflation of the two has created uneasiness about
the use of DNA barcodes as the foundation of future taxonomic de-
scriptions. We emphasize that DNA barcoding seeks merely to aid
in delimiting species—to highlight genetically distinct groups ex-
hibiting levels of sequence divergence suggestive of species status.
By contrast, DNA barcodes—by themselves—are never sufficient to
describe new species. (Hebert and Gregory 2005: 853)
Hence, the primary use of DNA barcodes is to match CO1
sequences to “known” species, i.e., species that have already
been characterized by taxonomists. According to advocates,
traditional methodologies must still be used for species discov-
ery. Returning to the North American bird study example, in or-
der to determine whether the four unmatched specimens were
in fact members of new species, they would need to undergo
further taxonomic analysis (involving multiple genes, ecologi-
cal characters, morphological characters, behavior, population
biology, geography, etc.).
The claim, then, is that DNA barcodes, by themselves,
are not sufficient to describe new species but that they suf-
fice to delimit known species. How so? How can members of
known species be identified solely with a “scan” of their bar-
code? The reason barcodes can discriminate between species
is due to the rapid sequence change in mitochondrial DNA
(mtDNA), which allows for the accumulation of differences
between populations that have only been separated for brief
periods of time (Hebert et al. 2004). Thus, mtDNA sequence
divergence between species is expected to be much larger than
within species.
At least this was the initial hypothesis. A number of studies
have since been conducted in an effort to find a correspondence
between the categories of species established by taxonomists
and those inferred by DNA barcoding proponents. These stud-
ies were aimed at confirming the presence of a unique barcode
in every species and identifying the sequence similarity thresh-
old particular to each. However, what the studies have shown is
that certain kinds of organisms do not have unique barcodes at
the CO1 location; examples include amphibians (Vences et al.
2005), plants (Kress et al. 2005), sea anemones, corals, and
some jellyfish (Hebert et al. 2003). As for the organisms that
do have unique barcodes, the sequence similarity criterion for
species membership was set to no more than 3% divergence for
all insects, but 2% for birds and mammals (Hebert et al. 2003).
Adjustments were thus made to the initial DNA barcode
hypothesis as it was tested against the established taxonomic
groups. Recent claims put forth by Hebert hold that CO1 se-
quences are 99.75% identical between members of one species
and less than 97.5% identical across members of various
species (Strauss 2006). The small margin between being in-
cluded and excluded from a species is likely what accounts
for the high success rate of DNA barcoding, where “success”
means the proportion of specimens identified with the use of
DNA barcodes that match the species distinguished by prior
taxonomic work. So far, DNA barcoding studies that looked
at species of birds, spiders, fish, springtails, and several arrays
of Lepidoptera have been close to 100% accurate in their dis-
crimination (Hebert et al. 2004; Hogg and Hebert 2004; Barrett
and Hebert 2005; Ward et al. 2005; Hajibabaei et al. 2006).
These and other studies are held up as strong evidence to jus-
tify the utility of DNA barcodes as good diagnostic characters
for species delimitation.
What are the Theoretical Commitments
of DNA Barcoding?
If these studies license the sole use of barcodes for species
delimitation, then they do so under the following assumption:
If members of a species share a unique similarity, then that
similarity may be used, by itself, to pick out members of
a species.1 But if barcoders want to use the CO1 sequence
to pick out members of a species, they need a theory about
species that explains why the barcode is the relevant similarity.
Otherwise, their categories would seem to be merely based on
CO1 sequence similarity, and categories based on similarity
without theory run the risk of being circular. Let me explain.
Organisms can be similar with respect to different prop-
erties, which means that any two organisms similar from one
point of view may be dissimilar from another. As Nelson Good-
man put it, “Any two things have exactly as many properties
in common as any other two” (Goodman 1972: 443). This is
because we could classify things according to the category of
being “less than 100 meters long,” being “less than 101 me-
ters long,” etc., leading to an infinite number of similarities
and dissimilarities between any two organisms. Consequently,
proponents of DNA barcoding need to have an argument for
why the barcode is the right similarity. In other words, why
should we group organisms according to their CO1 sequence
and not by some other property? If the only theory of species
on the table is one that invokes a CO1 sequence similarity
criterion, then DNA barcoding advocates do not have a good
answer to that question. And if two objects, or two organisms,
are similar only because they are in the same category (e.g., if
two animals from the category Homo sapiens are similar only
because they have the Homo sapiens CO1 sequence), then any
account of categorization based on similarity is circular.
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In spite of the looming circularity objection, DNA bar-
coders have not articulated their own theory of species, prob-
ably because they take themselves to be merely delimiting
species, whereas the theoretical task of defining species is dele-
gated to taxonomists (Hebert and Gregory 2005). Accordingly,
the taxonomists are the ones who deal with the hard questions,
such as “What are species?,” “What constitutes a speciation
event?,” etc. DNA barcoders are only concerned with group
membership, which is a relatively simple “yes” or “no” identi-
fication procedure based on predefined units (Rubinoff 2006).
Barcoders are right to point out the distinction between
defining species and deciding how these entities are to be de-
limited (Sites and Marshall 2003), but they fail to mention the
intimate connection between the two. Which individuals are
allocated to a given species depends on the criteria used to
delimit species, and the delimiting criteria are determined by
the concept of what a species is. This is why different concepts
lead to incongruent species boundaries. Thus, a recent litera-
ture survey revealed a 48.7% higher count of species with the
application of a phylogenetic species concept compared with
studies applying the biological species concept to the same set
of organisms (Agapow et al. 2004). Similarly, the allocation
of members has a direct influence on which segments of sepa-
rately evolving lineages end up corresponding to the category
“species.” The point is that different species concepts can lead
to different members of species, and different members can
lead to different species concepts.
The surplus of species concepts and membership criteria
is in large part due to the complex way in which species evolve.
While the formation of species as parts of evolving lineages can
be explained in terms of a few general evolutionary processes
(mutation, natural selection, migration, and genetic drift), the
characters affected by these processes are highly diverse. They
may be genotypic or phenotypic; qualitative or quantitative; se-
lectively advantageous, disadvantageous, or neutral. And they
may involve many different aspects of organismal biology, in-
cluding genetics, development, morphology, physiology, and
behavior (De Queiroz 2007: 881). Species may acquire any
number of the above characters as they separate and diverge
from one another, but the evidence is usually indirect (Vogler
and Monaghan 2007: 5). This is the reason why delimiting
criteria vary and are ultimately determined by an underlying
species concept.
When DNA barcoders rely on the CO1 sequence to al-
locate unidentified specimens to particular species, the allo-
cation has a direct influence on which segments of the sepa-
rately evolving lineages end up corresponding to the category
“species.” In particular, the sharp boundary by which DNA bar-
coders delimit species reveals their theoretical commitment as
to what constitutes a speciation event. Here is why. If a spec-
imen were found with a mutation at the CO1 location, which
changed similarity to below 97.5%, we already know that DNA
barcoders would not feel confident assigning the diverged se-
quence to a different species—especially if there was no match
for it in the barcode library. (This goes back to one of their
commitments—that barcodes, by themselves, are never suffi-
cient to describe new species.) What barcoders would do, how-
ever, is exclude the specimen from the current species and put
it aside for traditional taxonomists to make the final analysis—
which means that they are willing to toss the specimen into the
“unknown” species pile. But in doing so they actually make a
claim about what is required for a speciation event to occur, be-
cause by throwing the diverged sequence into the “unknown”
pile they are claiming that a specimen with a sequence less
than 97.5% similar to the sequences of other members is itself
not a member. Thus, the 97.5% mark is their cutoff point for
either belonging to or being excluded from a species, which is
why the specimen with a sequence that drops below the cutoff
point will no longer belong to that species but to some other
(whether or not this other species has yet been identified is
irrelevant). Consequently, DNA barcoders must be committed
to the idea that a mutation at the CO1 location that changes
similarity to below 97.5% constitutes a speciation event.
Another way of thinking about this theoretical commit-
ment is inspired by the perspective of conservation biology:
DNA barcoders are committed to a certain view regarding the
percent divergence at the CO1 location that needs to be in
place before diversity assessments (declaring the number of
separate species present) can be made. Either way, the pic-
ture that emerges is that for barcoders the way to pick out
species from separately evolving lineages is by looking for
CO1 sequences that have diverged past the 97.5% mark.
Are DNA Barcoders and Taxonomists
Tracking the Same Entities?
There are at least two problems with this characterization of
species. First, setting a sharp boundary between species (based
on sequence divergence levels, e.g., >3%) conflicts with the
kind of continuity found in nature. Species change contin-
uously and are gradually transformed into novel ones. The
process of speciation does not include sudden discontinuities
that could be used as a specific boundary (Cain 1954: 107). The
apparent state of equilibrium of species is just a current repre-
sentation of a continuously evolving lineage, a mere illusion
fostered by the shortness of the human lifespan (Gross 1988:
226). In all but a few cases, speciation is a long and gradual
process such that there is no principled way to draw a precise
boundary between one species and the next. The boundaries
between species are vague (Hull 1965). Given this vagueness,
asking for a sharp boundary by which to delimit species is an
implausible demand. It is as implausible as demanding that a
precise number of dollars marks the boundary between rich
and poor or that a precise number of hair marks the boundary
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between bald and not bald. If being a species along with being
a heap of stones, being bald, and being rich are all concepts
beset by line-drawing problems (Sober 1980: 356), then the
DNA barcode is an arbitrary cutoff for species delimitation.
The second problem with the barcoders’ characterization
of species is their emphasis on the degree of similarity over
common ancestry. Species are segments of separately evolving
lineages; they are properly defined by the only attribute they
possess that cannot change during the course of evolution—
their ancestry. How does one determine which organisms are
parts of which lineage? Genetic similarities may provide the
evidence, since they are typically inherited along ancestral
lines, but the determining factor is the relation among organ-
isms. The same rule applies to family trees. Being part of
my immediate family turns on my siblings, my parents, and I
having certain biological relations to one another, not on our
having similar features. I may have inherited my mother’s gene
for cystic fibrosis and my father’s gene for tongue rolling, but
the genetic similarities between us are not the reason we are
part of the same family; we are part of the same family because
we are appropriately causally connected (Hull 1976, 1978; see
also Ereshefsky 2007).
DNA barcoders have denied ancestry a central role in tax-
onomy by using only one line of evidence to delimit species,
viz., sequence similarity at the CO1 location. Consequently,
they have fallen victim to circular reasoning: thinking that a
shared similarity between the members of a species is suffi-
cient for species membership. By not considering another line
of evidence to test their hypothesis, they placed themselves
in a position from which they cannot break out of that circle.
Traditional taxonomists avoid this problem (and thus preserve
the scientific aspect of species delimitation) by relying on mul-
tiple genes, ecological characters, morphological characters,
behavior, population biology, and geography when identifying
species (DeSalle et al. 2005). DNA barcoders, however, have
favored a single attribute (other than ancestry), and as a result,
they have reversed the priority of the evidence with the priority
of the natural process, giving rise to the evidence.
In sum, the barcoders’ use of a sharp boundary by which to
delimit species amounts to smuggling in theoretical claims as
to what constitutes a speciation event—claims incompatible
with the way taxonomists conceive of species. Given these
inconsistencies, I conclude that even if the groupings based
on DNA barcodes match those of an existing taxonomy, such
findings are not sufficient to prove that the two systems of
classification are in fact tracking the same entities.
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Note
1. The reason the unique similarity has to be used by itself to pick out
members of a species is that the barcode was never meant to be one among
many diagnostic characters. It was meant as the only one. If it were otherwise,
DNA barcoding would be nothing new; the use of DNA for the identification of
species—along with other diagnostic techniques—goes back to the beginning
of molecular systematics (Kipling et al. 2005: 844).
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